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ARTICLES
THE CONVERGENCE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF POLITICAL
INTEGRATION: THE WOOD PULP CASE AND THE ALCOA
EFFECTS DOCTRINE
James J. Friedberg*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Law is significant in at least two ways with respect to the monumental changes that we are witnessing in today's world order. First, the
rule of law is replacing arbitrary bureaucratic discretion and ideological determinism in the newly emerging pluralist democracies of Eastern
Europe and elsewhere. Second, the integration of these states into the
community of pluralist democracies will likely signify a convergence of
the actual substantive and procedural rules followed by various nations.
Such a harmonization of standards of behavior-whether regarding
transportation, competition, environment, or other matters of transnational concern-should have obvious benefits for an interdependent
world community. These benefits would include less political conflict
and reduced economic inefficiency. The convergence of law that one
expects to occur across the old Iron Curtain has already taken place to
a great extent among western democracies. One of the best examples of
this convergence is found in the area of antitrust law. 1 This Article
examines the movement from conflict to resolution in a particular aspect of this area: extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Interestingly,
the European Community ("EC") is addressing the need for similar
antitrust harmonization in regard to East German enterprises now
within the EC's regulatory ambit.2 The recent doctrinal convergence
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Pittsburgh 1989-1990. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1975; B.A. Temple University, 1972. The author thanks his research assistant Melinda Turici of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
for her valuable help in researching and editing this Article.
1. The terms antitrust and competition law describe the same doctrinal area. Antitrust law

is the common American usage whereas competition law is the common European usage.
2.

European Community Asks Berlin to Consult It on Merger Actions, Int'l Herald Trib-
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across western borders, discussed in this Article, could be instructive as

to a similar convergence of law, in the near future, between East and
West.
Traditionally, Europeans have been much more reluctant than
American jurists to accept extraterritorial assertions of legislative and
judicial jurisdiction. 3 Throughout the last forty years, this contrast has

been strikingly apparent in the application of. antitrust law in the
United States and in Europe. On numerous occasions, governments,
judges, and legislators in Europe have responded angrily, and sometimes, effectively, to U.S. attempts to apply American antitrust laws to
activities of European nationals occurring outside the United States.
The focal point of the extraterritoriality controversy between American
and European authorities has been the Alcoa "effects" doctrine, enunciated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa") 4 in

1945 at a time when United States political and economic influence
was profoundly expanding in a Europe decimated by war. It was perhaps inevitable that as a recovered Europe asserted greater economic
independence from the United States, the postwar expansion of American judicial reach would be opposed and, turned back.
Ironically, however, European resistance to American assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction has coincided with a heretofore subtler

trend on the part of.the Europeans themselves to extend their own territorial reach in competition cases. While such phenomena as European
blocking legislation 5 and American case law retrenchment from an exune, July 4, 1990, at 9, col. 7.
3. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
1979); United States v.
In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11.
1977); Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v.
AMAX, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)'1 61,467 (N.D. I11.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1978 A.C. 547.
4. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See also
infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
5. Many countries have responded to United States extraterritorial jurisdiction by enacting
"blocking" legislation aimed at invalidating United States jurisdiction, obstructing pretrial discovery and hampering efforts to enforce domestic judgments. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980, for example, contains a "claw back" provision which creates a cause of action in
English courts for recovery of the punitive portion of a foreign damage judgment in certain circumstances, notably when the non-British judgment concerns activity, outside the enforcing nation's territory (e.g., extraterritorial jurisdiction). Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.
11. See also The Canadian Combines Investigation Act of 1975, § 31.6, as cited in, D. ROSENTHAL, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL-

80 (1982). For an analysis of various blocking statutes, see A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION (1983). See also Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction;The British ProtecITY

tion of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981). See also Dam, Economic and
Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality,19 INT'L LAW..887 (1985) (examination of swiss and
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pansive effects doctrine have received much attention, European movement toward just such a doctrine has been real and continual for the
last twenty or so years, at least in the application of European Community competition law to non-Community undertakings. To some lesser
degree, national competition authorities in EC member states have embarked on the same path.8
The result of these trends on either side of the Atlantic is a convergence of extraterritoriality doctrine in American antitrust and European competition law. The European Court of Justice's ("ECJ's") December 1988 decision in In re Wood Pulp Cartel v. European
Community Commission ("Wood Pulp")7 is the most recent and most
complete example of such convergence. The Court finally did what the
European Commission had been urging it to do for nearly two decades;
the Court accepted, in a modified form, the "effects doctrine" for competition cases. 8 It did so to the ironic backdrop of American companies
raising the same cries of judicial overreach that for years have been
directed at American courts by European defendants. 9
canadian blocking statutes).
6. See, e.g., Philip Morris Inc. v. Bundeskartellamt, 1984 Eur. Comm. Cas. 393 (Ct. App.
1983) (Case Kart 16/82), where the German Court of Appeals held that international law does
not, in principle, prevent German cartel law application to restraints of competition which are
caused abroad, but which produce effects within Germany. The court found there was no reason
to regard a foreign merger as an obstacle to regulation of the domestic situation since the foreign
merger was not produced by a foreign sovereign act. The German court did, however, limit the
authority for prohibition to the domestic effects of the merger, and held invalid a cartel office
order which attempted to prohibit the entire merger, even that part which took place outside of
Germany. On appeal, the German Supreme Court declined to consider the issue since, as the
merger had been restructured, the point was moot.
7. In re Wood Pulp Cartel v. E.C. Comm'n, [1988] 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 901 [hereinafter
"Wood Pulp"].
8. A recent case note in the HarvardInternationalLaw Review asserts that the ECJ did not
adopt the effects doctrine in the Wood Pulp case while acknowledging that it did apply the principle of objective territoriality.Note, European Community Law: The TerritorialScope of Application of ECC Antitrust Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 195 (1989). Such a distinction is trivial and
misses the clear implications of the ECJ judgment. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text
for discussion of this significant issue of doctrinal interpretation.
9. The United States defendants in this suit were members of KEA, an association established under the provisions of the Webb-Pomerence Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982). Under that
Act, United States companies may, without infringing United States antitrust legislation, form
associations for the joint promotion of their exports. Members may also hold meetings for the
exchange of information and agree upon export prices. The U.S. defendants argued that the principle of comity protected the activities conducted within the United States in conformity with the
Webb-Pomerence Act from Community sanction. KEA argued further that the application of
Community competition rules to them was contrary to public international law principles of noninterference. Wood Pulp, [19881 4 Common Mkt. L.R. at 932-40.
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UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:289

This Article will examine the cases, legislation, and executive deci-

sions that demonstrate the convergence of extraterritoriality doctrine in
American and European competition law. In the American context,
this will include analysis of: Alcoa and its progeny, with emphasis on
effects doctrine cases in the last ten years;'" recent discretionary decisions by the Justice Department and other parts of the executive
branch tending to limit American extraterritoriality; and the amend-

ment of the Sherman Act, as part of the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982 under Title IV." In the European context, this will include
analysis of: European Court of Justice cases that have dealt with extraterritoriality decisions, with special attention being given to the Wood
Pulp case; EC Commission competition decisions; relevant law from
European national (German) adjudicatory bodies; and positions taken
by other EC or national institutions. While American legal literature
has extensively examined United States law on antitrust extraterritori-

ality, its convergence with its European doctrinal counterpart has been
less thoroughly analyzed.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the late 1940's, Europeans were emerging from the second rav-

aging of their continent to occur within a generation. The devastation,
both in World War I and II, was self-inflicted. It was a product, to a
large degree, of rampant nationalism and economic conflict between

European powers, especially between France and Germany. 12 The roots
of this conflict ran deep into the nineteenth century, before a German
nation-state even existed.' 3 After the Second World War, numerous
European statesmen recognized that European cooperation, especially
10.
11.
12.

See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 6a (Supp. 1990).
See, W. DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC COOPERATION 19501959 1-46 (1959); see also W. LIPGENS, A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1982).
13. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was in a sense a preview of the two world wars.
Prussia's military success marked the first modern German challenge to French continental hegemony. When Prussia became the core of the new German Empire, sharing a border and claims
to disputed border regions with France (e.g., Alsace-Lorraine), future conflagration was not unpredictable. The Sherman Act was passed in 1890. The comparative chronology is interesting to
note. When the United States embarked on its antitrust policy, Germany had just come into
existence as a unified state (in political, economic, and military competition with France). See
generally E. BURNS, R. LERNER & S. MEACHAM, WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS: THEIR HISTORY AND
CULTURE 814-18 (1984); W. DIEBOLD, supra note 12, at 1-46; W. LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES AND ALIGNMENT 1871-1890 (1950); W. McNEILL, HISTORY OF WESTERN CIVILIZATIONS:
A HANDBOOK 547-49, 552-56 (1986).
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Franco-German cooperation, had to be substituted for competitive nationalism so the continent could avoid a repetition of the horrors of the
recent past.14
While everyone agreed that the minimum goal was an end to wars
ignited by German-French competition, many held the more far-reaching aim of developing a pan-European political union. 15 The creation of
the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC") was the first major step in this process for increased European cooperation. It might
have appeared a relatively limited step when viewed in the context of
the grand vision of a United States of Europe. Nevertheless, the leading statesmen of Europe were both practical and idealistic. They believed that European unity could best be achieved through modest, concrete steps."6 While immediate political union was unrealistic, a limited
single-industry customs union was not. The ECSC officially came into
being with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951.11 France, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg were the
original members of the Community. 8 The treaty comprehensively integrated trade in coal, iron, and steel throughout the six nations.
Compelling reasons caused these industries to be the narrow focus
of the first modern efforts of European integration. The geopolitical
14. See infra Section IV of this Article discussing German reunification and the significance
of European and North Atlantic integration.
15. See W. DIEBOLD, supra note 12, at 1-46.
16. After failed attempts to create a customs union between France and Italy, it seemed
proper to attempt a less ambitious plan limited to one basic industry. Coal and steel were selected
as the industry basic to many other industries and one especially relevant to war. If war were to
be eliminated, it was thought coal and steel must be put under international control. The Schuman Plan was proposed by Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in May
1950. The Schuman Plan proposed to place all the Franco-German production of coal and steel
under a common authority and invited other countries-to do the same. See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1982).
17. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter "Treaty of Paris"].
18. Discussions had been held with Great Britain concerning its membership, but it ultimately declined to join. Even with its limited purpose, the ECSC clearly represented a relinquishment by its members of some individual national sovereignty in pursuit of regional economic goals.
Perhaps, at that time, in the early 1950's, Britain was not yet reconciled to the fact that it was no
longer a first class world power on its own. Perhaps because of its bonds to the commonwealth nee'
Empire the idea of its future as part of a greater whole was not as appealing to Britain as to the
other European countries. Reality prevailed by the 1960's when Britain decided seriously to pursue membership in the European Communities, finally gaining admission in 1973, after some temporarily successful rear guard opposition by the de Gaulle government in France. See W.
DIEBOLD, supra note 12, at 48-60. See also D. FREESTONE & J. DAVIDSON, THE INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 5 (1988).
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conflict between France and Germany during the preceding threequarters of a century had been focused sectorially in the coal and steel
industry, and geographically in the border regions joining the two powers-regions where coal and iron resources were plentiful and where
the steel industry flourished. The three wars fought between 1870 and
1945 partly reflected attempts by one nation or the other to control

those resources for itself and deny them to the other. The success of
each nation's vital steel industry was seen to hang in the balance. Turning Franco-German conflict over coal, iron, and steel into Franco-German interdependence was a goal which promised to the early molders
of European unity a much more stable continent.
It was central to this goal that Articles 65 and 6619 of the Treaty
19. The European Coal and Steel Community was a limited-sector attempt at economic
integration initiated in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris. Its success prompted its six members (France,
Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) to seek general economic integration
through the Treaty of Rome in 1957, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter "Treaty of Rome" or "EEC Treaty"]. The administrative functions of the two communities (along with those of the European Atomic Energy Community) were combined in 1967. See generally D. FREESTONE & J. DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at
4-6.
Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty parallel Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.
Generally speaking, Articles 65 and 66 would be applicable to competition problems in the coal
and steel sector. ECSC Article 65 and EEC Article 85 prohibit restraints of trade by two or more
parties. ECSC Article 66 is a merger control provision. EEC ,Article 86 prohibits abuse of a
dominant position, essentially a curb on monopolies. Since the same institutions (EC Commission
and European Court of Justice) enforce and adjudicate both pairs of articles, it is a reasonable
assumption that jurisprudence developed under the EEC treaty, including the effects doctrine,
would be applied in analogous coal and steel cases.
Treaty of Paris Articles 65 and 66 provide in relevant part as follows:
Article 65§C
1. There are hereby forbidden all agreements among enterprises, all decisions of associations of enterprises and all concerted practices which would tend directly or indirectly
to prevent, restrict or impede the normal operation competition within the common
market, and in particular [those tending]:
(a) to fix or influence prices;
(b) to restrict or control production, technical development or investments;
(c) to allocate markets, products, customers or sources of supply.
Article 65, 261 U.N.T.S. 195.
Article 66§C
1.. .. Any transaction which would have in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing
about a concentration within the territories in the first paragraph of Article 79,'involving
enterprises of at least one of which falls under the application of Article 80, shall be submitted to a prior authorization of the High Authority. The obligation shall be effective
whether the operation in question is carried out by a person or an enterprise, or a group of
persons or enterprises, whether it concerns a single product or different products, whether it
is effected by a merger, acquisition of shares or assets, loan, contract, or any other means
of control. For the application of the above provision, the High Authority will define by a
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of Paris attacked trade restraint and monopoly abuse. During much of
the first half of the twentieth century, German steel cartels controlled
essential coal and iron resources, often making it difficult for other European firms to compete. The French especially were determined that
no cartelized German steel industry would ever again have a stranglehold on European manufacture.2 0 Thus, to insure free trade in coal and
steel, the ECSC's immediate purpose, it was necessary to severely restrict the potential power of cartels. It would be insufficient to eliminate public obstacles to free trade, such as tariffs, while allowing private obstacles, such as price fixing and monopolization, to remain
unchecked.
While Article 65 bears a striking similarity to sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act,21 significant differences must be recognized in the
genesis of the two laws. The competition articles in the Treaty of Paris
were drafted with the aims of advancing European integration and diminishing interstate tension through free trade. Secondarily, the articles were intended to benefit the European consumer. 2 Articles 85 and

86 were placed in the Treaty of Rome for the same purposes a few
years later when the EEC was founded with the goal of integrating
Europe's economies as the ECSC was integrating its steel and coal inregulation, established after consultation with the Council, what constitutes control of an
enterprise.
Article 66, 261 U.N.T.S. 199..
20. While the common market limited the likelihood of a renewed domination by German
industrial cartels, it provided an opportunity for Germany to begin its re-entry into the community
of civilized nations. Furthermore, the open European market has proven to be more of a boon to
German industrial health than was old style cartelization. See also W. DIEBOLD, supra note 12, at
9-12.
21. Sherman 'Act, ch. 647 § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988). Article 1 of the Sherman Act provides as follows:
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared
to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony . ...
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1. Pursuant to Article 2 of the European Economic Community Treaty, it
is the Community's task
"by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies
of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to
it.",
Article 2. 298. U.N.T.S. 15.
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dustries2 8 American antitrust law, on the other hand, was introduced
as a domestic statute into an already integrated political and economic
union; its chief aim seems more related to ideological notions of free
enterprise and open markets. American antitrust law was born at a
time when mammoth industrial trusts were threatening the continued
existence of such markets. 4
III.
A.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

IN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW

American Attitudes Toward Antitrust Extraterritoriality

Frederick Jackson Turner25 noted how the frontier shaped the
American character. Most likely, American attitudes toward competi-

tion and extraterritoriality have been similarly shaped by American geography. Whereas Europe is a continent of nations packed together ge23. Treaty of Rome Article 85 provides in relevant part:
§ 1. Rules Applying to Undertakings
ART. 85. 1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market...: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations
of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade
between the Member States and which have as their object or result the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common
Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other
trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or. control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance by a party
of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be null
and void.
Article 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48.
24. It is interesting to contrast the terminology used by Americans and Europeans for this
area of law. American antitrust law reflects an attitude that opposes any interference with free
markets and hence with free enterprise. European competition law focuses on the promotion of
competition to the extent that it promotes economic integration, consumer benefit, and efficiency.
There is no per se doctrine in European competition law, making certain actions illegal even if
those actions promote efficiency and consumer benefit. In U.S. antitrust law, Section 1 of the
Sherman Act may be applied in a per se approach. The per se doctrine labels as illegal any
practice to which it applies, regardless of the reasons for the practice and without inquiry as to its

effects. L. SULLIVAN,
25. F. TURNER,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY

153 (1977).
1-38 (1920).
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ographically and engaged in fierce industrial competition, America, for
two centuries, has remained a relatively isolated continental nation.
First, whereas European governments often supported and even
promoted national cartels as an effective means of competing with
other European industrial powers, nineteenth century American government and industry were in a much different situation. In America,
monopoly power was in no way limited by numerous national borders
in close proximity. Prior to the Sherman Act, monopoly power spread
across the continent, free from the competition between nations found
in Europe. Government action was needed to check national industry
before the competitive market was destroyed, rather than to support it
against competition from across nearby borders. American notions of
frontier, free market and liberty are probably tied to American substantive attitudes toward antitrust law.26 There is a kind of first-principle mythos to all this-competition as an absolute and self-evident
good, somehow linked to basic notions of economic and personal freedom. Europeans today are much more instrumentalist in their view of
competition law. They see it less as an end, and more as a means to
further continental unity through economic integration and to benefit
27
consumers.
Second, American jurisdictional attitudes about extraterritoriality
may also reflect geopsychological factors unique to America. While
Europeans must intuitively recognize the limits of national
power-living with other sovereigns at their doorsteps and with foreign
tongues heard a few dozen miles away-Americans are not likely to be
similarly sensitized. We are socialized with a sense of a continental
government-executive, judicial, and legislative-that, while limited in
its substantive power by constitutional federalism, is not limited by international geography in its jurisdictional reach.
26. Remarks of Attorney General Smith, Aug. 31, 1981, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) V
50,432 as cited in 2 EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW REVIEw 411 (1981). Smith refers to antitrust
laws as the "constitution of our economic liberties."
27, This view is exemplified by the following quote:
When it operates satisfactorily, competition can be expected to perform. . . functions that
help towards a harmonious development of economic activity throughout the Community: a
resource allocation function, by encouraging better use of available factors of production,
so that firms' technical efficiency is increased and consumers' wants better satisfied. ...
The objective of competition policy is thus to ensure that competition is allowed to have
these beneficial effects, and, in the process, help mold the Community into a genuine common market.
Commission of the European Communities, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy 11 (1984).
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The Expansion and Retrenchment of American Doctrine
1. Case Law

Many articles have addressed the extraterritoriality question in
American antitrust case law. 28 There is no need to replough that wellworked ground here. This Article simply summarizes such developments in order to discuss convergence with the European doctrine.
Until the 1970's, American antitrust prosecutors and plaintiffs
continually expanded their jurisdictional grasp in order to extend territorial bounds. The courts supported, and to some extent promoted, this
effort. This expansion of jurisdiction was not surprising given the increase in United States geopolitical influence between 1900 and 1960.
Because judicial doctrine sometimes lags behind political reality, it is
understandable that a retrenchment of United States extraterritoriality
doctrine did not become apparent until a decade or so after clear signs
of waning political influence. 9
The Alcoa decision, a 'Second Circuit case of almost Supreme
Court stature, heralded the full throttle advance of American antitrust
reach that was to characterize the next twenty or thirty years.3 1 Interestingly, the case was decided in 1945-a time when much of the world
was decimated, when many countries were hosts to a new United
States military presence, and when the flow of American capital that
was to foster the economic rejuvenation of both the crippled European
continent and the Pacific rim was about to begin."
28.

See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act to Foreign Corpora-

tions, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (1986); Note, Extraterritoriality: Current Policy of the United
States, 12 SYRACUSE J.INT'L L. & COM. 493 (1986); Schmidt, The Extraterritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Laws, 5 U. PITr. J. L. & COM. 321 (1985); Snyder, International
Competition: Toward a Normative Theory of United States Antitrust Law and Policy, 3 B.U.
INT. L.J. 257 (1985).

29. Conversely, on occasion political reality may be behind judicial doctrine and eventually
be changed by that doctrine, as in aspects of the civil rights struggle in the United States.
30. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Alcoa was
certified from the United States Supreme Court for failure of a quorum of qualified justices under
the authority of Pub. L. No. 78-332, 58 Stat. 272 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)). As a
result, the opinion hoids the authority of a de facto Supreme Court decision. The Supreme Court
reinforced the precedential value of Alcoa one year after the decision when it declared that Alcoa
"was ... decided under unique circumstances which add to its weight as a precedent." American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
32. Of course, the Cold War was also about to begin; therefore, this flow of capital was
meant not merely to rejuvenate the decimated nations, but also to keep them accessible to American markets. The American military presence in Europe and Asia further assured this accessibility. That American judicial doctrine was also expansionary at this time is not surprising under
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Alcoa's two-prong effects test, used for gauging the appropriateness of asserting jurisdiction over an antitrust claim against a foreign

defendant, is well known. Jurisdiction is asserted if (1) the challenged
activity was intended to have a substantial effect on interstate or foreign commerce, and (2) if it did have such an effect. Subsequent cases
repeated and reinforced the Alcoa rule, indicating that the Supreme

Court's restrictive view of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction expressed in 1909 in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.33 was no

longer binding precedent. 4
The Supreme Court made clear that American Banana was dead
and that Alcoa was good law by its 1962 holding in Continental Ore v.
Union Carbide.5 In that case, American and Canadian companies

were accused of a conspiracy that prevented an American competitor
from exporting to the Canadian market. Defendant Union Carbide argued that the principles of American Banana shielded it from liability.

The Supreme Court disagreed and indicated that later cases had rendered American Banana useless. The Court stated that "the domestic

or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of
the Sherman Act just because part of the challenged conduct occurs in
foreign countries."".
I Not everyone was pleased with the expansion and entrenchment of

87
the Alcoa doctrine. Europeans were especially hesitant to accept it
and, on occasion, European and American courts collided over the
matter. 8

these circumstances.
- 33. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). American Banana
Company had alleged that United Fruit Company had forced it out of business in Costa Rica by
persuading that nation's government to expropriate American Banana's land and interrupt its
transportation links. The Supreme Court found itself without jurisdiction because the complained
of acts occurred on foreign soil and because they were acts of state by the Costa Rican
government.
Some commentators have noted that the part of the American Banana decision that held that
the foreign status of an alleged antitrust violation defeats jurisdiction never had been followed
fully.
34. See Davidow, ExtraterritorialAntitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. OF WORLD
TRADE L. 500 & n.12, 504 & n.13 (1981) (citing United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913); United
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927)).
35. 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962).
36. Id. at 704.
37. See infra notes 84-117 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984). After numerous injunctions granted by both United States and United Kingdom courts and
the invocation of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, which prohibited persons carry-
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Beginning with Continental Ore in 1962, the decade of the sixties
may have been the high-water mark of American extraterritorial reach.
For instance, in United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,89 not only did the court hold that acts sanctioned by
foreign governments and performed by foreign nationals on foreign soil
were within the Sherman Act's prohibitions, but the court also sought
to enjoin the illegality by requiring affirmative acts on Swiss soil.4 0
In 1962, America's European allies were in its economic and political shadow, just emerging from a decade and a half of rebuilding. The
EEC was five years old and consisted of only six members. The United
States had not yet experienced the loss of political prestige, moral leadership, economic momentum, military dominance, and internal harmony that the decade of Vietnam was to bring. In contrast, ten years
after Continental Ore, the United States' relative position in world affairs had changed significantly. By the early seventies, the European
Community was successful and included Great Britain, France, and
Germany, the triad of significant Western European powers. It would
have been surprising for Europeans, in such a state of political rejuvenation, to have continued to allow America's extraterritorial antitrust
jurisdiction-which from the eastern shore of the Atlantic must certainly have looked like judicial imperialism. Furthermore, even Americans had begun to question the appropriateness of such jurisdiction,
just as they had been recently forced to reexamine the wisdom and
practicality of less benign forms of international projection of American power.
Whether related to the large political picture or not, in the 1970s
the attitudes of the American legal community did reveal a reversal of
the trend toward expansion that had dominated antitrust extraterritoriing on business within the United Kingdom from complying with United States antitrust jurisdiction, the United States and British courts' failure to resolve jurisdictional differences led to the
conclusion by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that both the United States and the United
Kingdom had jurisdiction. See also British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1952]
2 All. E.R. 780 (C.A.), where the British court found that full enforcement of an American
antitrust decree would violate British sovereignty because the British party involved in the suit

had not been before the American court. See United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F.
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
39. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., [1963 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
70,600, 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), modified, [1965] Trade Cas. (CCH)
71,352,

80,490 (S.D.N.Y, 1965). The court ordered an end to a watchmakers cartel illegal under the
American antitrust laws, but which was clearly supported by the Swiss government.
40.

Id. at

77,423.
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ality doctrine since Alcoa was decided in 1945.41 Section 40 of the Re-

statement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
presaged this change by calling for the sort of balancing of interests
mandated in the subsequent Timberlane and Mannington Mills cases.' 2
The retrenchment in United States extraterritorial reach began to
appear in American cases in 1976. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank

of America,"' the Ninth Circuit introduced a "jurisdictional rule of
reason" as an additional criterion to the test of Alcoa. Under
Timberlane, a balancing of certain factors would be considered in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction was reasonable under the
circumstances: nationality of parties, extent of conflict with foreign law
or policy, likelihood of compliance in the event of enforcement, significance of American effects versus foreign effects, intent to affect United

States commerce, and relative importance to alleged violations of conduct in the United States compared to conduct outside the United
States."

Jurisdiction speaks to a court's ultimate power and not to its discretion; perhaps this explains why the court in Mannington Mills, Inc.
v. Congoleum Corp."' chose a slightly different route in its retreat from
Alcoa. In Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit found that factors similar to those enunciated in Timberlane might militate toward the exer41. Davidow, supra note 34, at 505.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1962).
43. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). (This case was called into doubt by Bulk Oil (ZUG)
A.G. v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp.. 1134, affd without opinion, Bulk, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984)).
44. The Timberlane court listed seven factors that courts should consider in assessing the
reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
(2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of
business of corporations,
(3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance,
(4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those
elsewhere,
(5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce,
(6) the foreseeability of such effect, and
(7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. The Court then vacated the Timberlane dismissal and remanded the
case to the district court for consideration of the above factors. Id. at 615.
45. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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cise of comity, a decision to relinquish jurisdiction otherwise allowable
in deference to the interests of other sovereigns. Mannington Mills provides a checklist of ten variables to be balanced in making such a deci-

sion regarding comity." Both the Timberlane and the Mannington
Mills approaches show the influence of Section 40 of the Restatement

(Second).4
The political limits of American antitrust law were evident in the

highly-publicized suit of International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. OPEC." The effects doctrine was never really
reached in this case, because the lower court dismissed the suit on
grounds of sovereign immunity."9 The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision on other grounds, namely the Act-of-State Doctrine, which recognizes that our courts must avoid, in certain situations, passing judgment on the governmental acts of foreign sovereigns.50 The court. stated
46. The Mannington Mills Court restated the Timberlane factors and added several additional considerations for its checklist of ten relevant factors:
(1) degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) nationality of the parties;
(3) relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
(4) availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
(5) existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
(6) possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
(7) if relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements
by both countries;
(8) whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under ,similar circumstances;
(10) whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
47. One might be tempted to classify Timberlane's jurisdictional finding as mandatory and
Mannington Mills' comity holding as discretionary, but such distinctions don't always work. For
example, Act-of-State Doctrine comity might be mandatory,
48. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
49. The trial court dismissed the suit on its own motion, when the defendant failed to appear. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 55960 (1979). The trial court's justification for not entering a default judgment was a special provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, allowing consideration of sovereign immunity issues when an absent defendant is a foreign sovereign. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter "FSIA"]..
50. Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1361-62. The lower court's reliance on sovereign immunity was
problematic. It found that the alleged conspiratorial conduct .did not fall under the commercial
activity exception in the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Its analysis in this regard was
unconvincing. The Ninth Circuit conceived a more persuasive Act-of-State argument, viz., on
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that "not every case is identical in its potential impact on our relations
with other nations." 51 The critical element under Act-of-State analysis
was the potential for interference with foreign relations. The court
noted that the record contained extensive documentation of the thorough consideration given to OPEC policy and activity by both the exec52
utive and legislative branches when formulating foreign policy.
The judicial system had to find an "out" in the OPEC case. The
federal courts were impotent to break the oil cartel by a judicial fiat.
The very idea was naive and dangerous for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the fact that the suit was not clearly precluded under the American effects doctrine, at least in its farthest reaching applications, demonstrates how necessary some sort of retrenchment had become.
The retrenchment of American antitrust extraterritoriality doctrine should not be overstated. It is real, but limited. There is no
chance that the courts are heading back toward the days of American
Banana. Such limited movement is consistent with this Article's convergence theory, that American and European doctrines in this area
are approaching each other, but are certainly not passing in opposite
directions.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation53 provides a good example.of the continued viability of extraterritoriality in certain contexts. In this action, plaintiffs, Westinghouse
Electric Corporation & Tennessee Valley Authority, asserted that certain foreign and domestic uranium producers were fixing prices and
boycotting the plaintiff. Default judgments were entered in favor of
Westinghouse against nine non-appearing foreign defendants. The trial
court also entered orders enjoining the defaulters from transferring assets out of the United States without the court's approval. Appearing
defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, seeking to postpone any hearing on damages against the defaulters until after a trial on the merits. 4
The governments of the defaulting defendants, Australia, Canada,
South Africa, and the United Kingdom, filed amicus briefs challenging
the district court's jurisdiction. The British government argued that Algrounds of comity the court should refuse the case. However, if no immunity was found to exist,
then it is questionable whether other issues should have 'been considered on behalf of non-appear-

ing defendants. Id.
51. Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1360 (quoting Timberline Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976)).
52. Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1361.
53. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
54.

Id.
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coa should no longer control.55 Relying on Timberlane and Mannington
Mills, the British government contended that the Alcoa effects test is
incomplete, because it fails to consider other nations' interests.
The court rejected the arguments of the amici. The court stated
that the Mannington Mills formula was not the law of the Seventh
Circuit. It further observed that the case was distinguishable from
Timberlane and Mannington Mills in that the defendants in the case
before them had refused even to appear, making it almost impossible
for the trial court to explore fully the factual issues that a Mannington
Mills approach would raise.56 In the court's discussion of Timberlane,
Mannington Mills, and the "jurisdictional rule of reason," it distinguished between jurisdictional power and the discretionary exercise of
comity in declining that jurisdiction. 7 The Seventh Circuit found that
it was only in this latter context that the countervailing concerns of
foreign sovereignty and comity may be considered.
2.

The Restatements (Second and Third)

The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law 58 exemplifies
the retrenchment of the American effects doctrine. It also reveals a
contrary expansionist thrust. The Third Restatement is consistent with
the court's retrenching tendencies by requiring the Timberlane/Mannington balancing of interests, which the Second Restatement merely
advocated as advisable comity. 9 It is expansive, however, in that it appears to go beyond the Second Restatement in condoning jurisdiction
not only where extraterritorial conduct results in actual effects within
the law-prescribing state, but even where the effects are merely intended. Both of these positions have generated criticism. 60
The expansiveness of the general effects doctrine in section
402(l)(c) 6 ' is, however, mitigated by the language of a new section
55. The United Kingdom contended that Alcoa was no longer acceptable to United States
courts as "settled law" in light of the recent opinions of the United States Court of Appeals in
Timberlane and Mannington Mills. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d at 1254.

56. Id. at 1255-56.
57. Id. at 1254-55.
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
59.

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1986).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 40 (1962).
60. See, e.g., Olmstead, Restatement: Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.

INT'L L. 468 (1989); Note,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the Third .Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 127 (1988).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 402(1)(c) '(1986).
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dealing explicitly with antitrust extraterritoriality. Section 415 of the
Third Restatement 2 seems facially to require actual effects, even
though accompanying comment c disclaims-any position on the matter. s The Justice Department's new version of its Antitrust Guidelines6" partially moots this point, by indicating that only where effects
are "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" is U.S. antitrust
law applicable. 65 While this guideline does not bind courts and
nongovernment plaintiffs, it does indicate where federal prosecutors will
draw the jurisdictional line.
The sections on extraterritoriality were among the most controversial during the many preliminary drafts of the new Restatement. In
fact, disagreement over these very sections probably contributed heavily to the unusual extent of redrafting. The controversy remains after
the final version; the Restatement is criticized as not restating law, but
propounding it.66 Perhaps the Restatement does restate, as settled law,
something that at this point is only a strong trend-namely the establishment of the modified effects doctrine as part of international law.
As this Article maintains, the doctrinal movement on both sides of the
Atlantic is in that direction. Whether the principle of modified effects
is sufficiently entrenched to be "restated" is not an argument of this
Article.
C.

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act and Substantiality-Retrenchment by Congress

The (presumably) final word on the substantiality issue was given
by Congress in 1982, when it passed the Export Trading Company
Act. 7 Title IV of that legislation, the Foreign Trade Antitrust ImId. at § 415.
63. Id. at § 415, comment c.
64. See infra note 81, new Department of Justice Antitrust Guidelines of 1988.
65. Id.
66. Olmstead, supra note 60; Note, supra note 60.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (Title
IV of the Export Trading Company Act) amended the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act
with respect to non-import transactions, i.e., export and purely foreign transactions. Jurisdiction
over import transactions was not affected. Title IV requires a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on domestic commerce or on the trade of a person engaged in United States
export commerce for jurisdiction under United States antitrust laws. See I B. HAWK, UNITED
STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE, 166
62.

(1985).
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provements Act ("FTAIA") 68 amended section 7 of the Sherman Act6"
as follows:
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce
(other than import trade or import commerce), with foreign nations unless(1) "such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the
United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 7.

If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph
(1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export
business in the United States.70

Congress finally chose between varying judicial interpretations and apparently codified the existing Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission practice of applying the Sherman Act 71 and Subsection
5(a) of the FTC Act 72 to foreign commerce.
The purpose of the bill was to aid American business by relieving
uncertainty over when its foreign commercial activity would be subject
to United States antitrust law.7 3 An additional purpose was to diminish
tension with those foreign nations that had reacted negatively to previous far-reaching extraterritorial enforcement of United States law.74
The bill provides that before a federal court hears a Sherman Act suit,
it must initially determine whether the alleged conduct had a direct
and substantial effect on U.S. commerce.7 5 Legislative history indicates
that proponents claimed the bill was not intended to make any significant changes in the law, but was merely a codification of contemporaneous enforcement policy and judicial interpretation concerning en68. 15 U.S.C. 8 6a (1982).
69. 15 U.S.C. 88 1-7 (1982).
70. 15 U.S.C. 8 6a (1982).
71. 15 U.S.C. 88 1-7 (1982).
72. 15 U.S.C. 88 41-51 (1982).
73. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Hearing before the Committee on the
Sess. 1-2 (1981) [hereinafter "FTAIA Hearings"] (statement of Strom
Judiciary,97th Cong., Ist
Thurmond, Committee Chairman).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2.
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forcement policy.7 6 As to enforcement policy, this was probably an
accurate claim, since the executive branch had retrenched to this position both in its practice and in its 1977 Antitrust Guide on International Operations.7 However, as discussed above, judicial interpretation was really somewhat varied, as demonstrated by the Seventh
Circuit's choice not to follow the Timberlane/ManningtonMills line in
78
the Uranium Antitrust Litigation case.
The FTAIA recognized that certain American antitrust rules
might be appropriate in domestic enforcement, but too stringent if applied to foreign trade, especially to parties whose national governments
had more lax competition policy.7 9 The statute also recognized an increase in foreign antitrust enforcement in the last ten to fifteen years.80
Combined with greater American deference, this is precisely the type
of convergence of law that this Article describes. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act, therefore, signifies legislative recognition
of the reality of interdependence and relative equality among international trading partners.
D. Retrenchment by the Executive Branch
In 1977, the Antitrust Division of .the United States Justice Department published the Antitrust Guide on International Operations.
This booklet was intended to aid United States businesses concerning
the antitrust ramifications of certain types of international transactions.
In specifying the kinds of situations that would likely lead to prosecution, the guide reinforced the contemporaneous movement of the federal courts toward some kind of rule of reason balancing test, under
which United States antitrust laws would not be enforced to their literal limit. For instance, the substantiality requirement is highlighted in
such a way that indirect effects were unlikely to be deemed subject to
prosecution.81
76. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 73, at 14 (Statement of William F. Baxter, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division).
77. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,110 (Jan. 26, 1977).
78. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 73. See also D. RoSENTRAL, supra note 5, at 2-3.
80. FTAIA Hearings, supra note 73, at 24-26 (Statement of Robert Pitofsky, Esq., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, and Counsel, Arnold & Porter, Washington,
D.C.).
81. See supra note 77. The Department of Justice released new Antitrust Guidelines for
International Operations on November 10, 1988, replacing the 1977 guidelines. Trade Reg. Rep.
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Prosecutorial decision-making in actual cases also indicates a retrenchment consistent with that followed by the other branches of government. In the uranium cartel litigation, 2 in which Westinghouse and
Tennessee Valley Authority had brought civil actions against members
of the international uranium cartel, the Justice Department offered
only lukewarm support in spite of incontestable evidence in cartel documents that a uranium cartel had, in fact, existed. The Justice Department chose not to prosecute any of the non-United States participants.
Furthermore, its prosecution of Gulf Oil Corporation, probably the
only fully domestic participant in the cartel, took the form of only a
misdemeanor charge to which Gulf was allowed to plead no contest and
pay a trifling $40,000 fine.
The executive department's position concerning oil price fixing in
the litigation was clear, in contrast to its ambivalent posture in the
Uranium cases. 8 The executive branch actively and successfully opposed the civil litigation by filing amicus briefs against its continuation.
In the OPEC case the government's position seems unmistakably correct; pursuing the sovereign governments that formed the OPEC cartel
was treading too far into the realm of foreign policy by domestic civil
litigation. As a result, the government's position in the uranium suit
appeared less aggressive than it could have been considering that the
defendants, largely private parties, were motivated more by commercial
concerns than by sovereign ones. Thus, since the uranium litigation was
a less compelling case for United States government deference to sovereign interests, the deference shown is all the more probative of a retrenchment from strong extraterritoriality.
IV.

A.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW

Cases Before the European Court of Justice

For years nobody knew exactly how the European Court of Justice
("ECJ") perceived the effects doctrine. In avoiding a literal application
of the effects doctrine in the cases decided prior to Wood Pulp, the
ECJ invariably found the challenged action to have occurred within the
Common Market, and usually found it to have occurred through a sub(CCH), extra edition #24 (Nov. 10, 1988).
82. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 5357 and accompanying text.
83. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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sidiary established in one of the member states. 4 It thus avoided the
more knotty question of whether the Common Market antitrust laws
have extraterritorial reach sufficient to justify jurisdiction over companies whose actions occur wholly outside the Common Market but have
effects that are nevertheless felt on European Community commerce.
The cases discussed in this section demonstrate the evolution of ECJ
law and how that court sidestepped this delicate issue prior to the
Wood Pulp case.
To speak of a Common Market attitude toward the effects doctrine would be something of an oversimplification. The Common Market is not a monolithic institution. As with most modern national governments, its powers are dispersed among a variety of actors.8 5 Thus,
the evolution of the effects doctrine in the European Community is not
a simple evolution. For instance, the EC Commission and the ECJ's
Advocate General both accepted the effects doctrine well before the
doctrine was accepted by the ECJ itself.
In Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export SA, 88 the plaintiff
sued the defendant for infringing its exclusive French distribution
rights to Japanese-made lighters. Defendant argued that the contract
between the Japanese company and the plaintiff, under which plaintiff
received the exclusive distribution rights, was void as violating EEC
competition laws. The issue raised was whether an agreement in which
one of the parties is situated in a nonmember country is still covered by
Article 85 of the EEC treaty. The court, in this 1972 decision, held
that Article 85 applied so long as the agreement produced effects on
the territory in the Common Market.8 This was the first hint that an
effects doctrine was creeping into Community competition law; however, this limited holding was still a far cry from the extensive extraterritorial reach asserted by American courts under the Alcoa doctrine
and its progeny. Here, the company from the nonmember country (Japan) was not even a party to the lawsuit, let alone the target of any
direct EC sanctions. The European Community was merely refusing to
give effect to a contract to which the Japanese company was a party
when that contract operated within Community borders in a way that
violated Community law.
84. See supra notes 28-36.
85. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the European Community institutions' differing roles in the evolution of European competition law.
86. Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export SA, [1972] 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 81.
87. Id. at 95.

310

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:289

Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v. European Community Commission ("Dyestuffs") 88 implicated foreign companies more directly
than Benguelin. The European Commission found that a number of
firms, including three non-community member companies, had engaged
in concerted practices in violation of Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome."9 Specifically, a number of aniline dye manufacturers were
found to have fixed prices for dyestuffs sold in the Common Market
during the period from 1964 through 1968. Imperial Chemicals, a British company, Geigy, a Swiss company, and Sandoz, also a Swiss company, defended, in part, on jurisdictional grounds. They argued that
neither the Commission, nor the European Court of Justice, had any
authority over them as foreign companies. 90 This would have been an
ideal situation for the European Court of Justice to adopt the American-style effects doctrine. But despite the urging of both the Commission and the court's own Advocate General,9" the ECJ chose not to do
so. Instead, the court laid down the foundation of what has come to be
known as its "economic unit" theory. The court stated:
It follows from what has been said in examining the plea relating to the
existence of concerted practices, that the applicant company decided on increases
of sales prices of its products to users in the Common Market, increases which
are uniform in relation to the increases decided upon by the other manufacturers
involved. By making use of its power of direction over its subsidiaries established
in the community, the applicant was able to have its decision applied on this
market.
The applicant objects that this behavior is the behavior of its subsidiaries
and not of itself.
The fact that the subsidiary has a distinct legal personality does not suffice
to dispose of the possibility that its behavior might be imputed to the parent
company. Such may be the case in particular when the subsidiary, although having distinct legal personality, does not determine its behavior on the market in an.
autonomous manner but essentially carries out the instructions given to it by the
parent company. When the subsidiary does not enjoy any real autonomy in the
determination of its course of action on the market, the prohibitions imposed by
Article 85(1) may be considered inapplicable in the relations between the subsidiary and the parent company, with which it then forms one economic unit. In
view of the unity of the group thus formed, the activities of the subsidiaries may,
in certain circumstances, be imputed to the parent company.
It is well known that the applicant held at the time the whole, or at any rate
the majority, of the capital of the subsidiaries. The applicant was able to influence, in a decisive manner, the sale price policy of its subsidiaries in the Coin88. Imperial Chem. Ind. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, [1972 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557 [hereinafter "Dyestuffs"].
89. See supra note 23.
90. Dyestuffs, [1972] 11 Common Mkt. L.R. at 605.
91. Id. at 603.

1991]

CONVERGENCE OF LAW

mon Market, and it in fact made use of this power on the occasion of three price

increases under discussion ....
In these circumstances, the formal separation between these companies,
arising from their distinct legal personality, cannot, for the purposes of application of the competition rules, prevail against the unity of their behavior on the
market. Thus, it is indeed the applicant which carried out the concerted practice
within the Common Market.
The plea of lack of jurisdiction raised by the applicant must, therefore, be

held unfounded."

The court made it absolutely clear that it chose to be unclear on
the applicability of an American-style effects doctrine under European
Community law. Instead, the court formulated its own. doctrine to accomplish similar ends. By attributing the acts of a subsidiary to a foreign parent company, and by finding that. the acts of that subsidiary
had taken place within the Common Market, there was no need to deal
with the question of the jurisdictional consequences of anticompetitive
actions taking place outside the Common Market but producing effects
within it. Indeed, the court stated: "[a]s has already been established in
examining the contention relating to the jurisdiction of the Commission, such jurisdiction is not based merely on the effects of actions committed outside the Community, but on activities attributable to the
claimant within the Common Market."9 ,While that statement was
made in the specific context of defendants Geigy and Sandoz, it seems
equally applicable to defendant Imperial Chemical.
The court's Advocate General urged a different approach. The Advocate General relied heavily on American precedents and scholarship
in proposing that the court adopt the Alcoa effects doctrine. He pointed
out that it was natural that the competition law of the United States,
the oldest among industrial nations, had most fully worked out the criteria for territorial application of laws on'competitioi. He specifically
cited Judge Learned Hand's decision in the Alcoa case, noting with
seeming approval the applicability of the Sherman Act to foreign companies by reason of the effects of their behavior on United States commerce.9 4 The Advocate General further observed that both the European Commission and the defendants in the case at bar "widely relied
on" the Alcoa case in their presentations to the Court. 95
The Advocate General Went on to argue that the actual language
92. Id. at 628-29 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 598.
95. Id. at 599.
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of Community law under the EEC Treaty clearly applies the effects
principle. He stated that
Article 85 indisputably gives as the sole criteria the anti-competitive effect on the
Common Market, without taking into account either nationality or the locality of
the headquarters of the undertakings responsible for the breaches of competition.
The same applies under Article 86 as regards abusive exploitation of a dominant
position.96
The Advocate General concluded that both the national laws of other

states, and the language of the Treaty of Rome, justified the9 applica7
tion of the territorial effect criterion under certain conditions.

The ECJ did not explain in the Dyestuff case why it did not choose
to adopt the Advocate General's position on the effects doctrine; nor
did it explain why it did not choose to reject that doctrine outright.
Presumably, the court wished to keep its options open. On the one
hand, the court knew that the effects doctrine was controversial and
that it had been harshly criticized by European politicians, practition-

ers, and scholars, especially when employed by American courts
against Europeans." On the other hand, there might come a day when
the Community, in order to protect its interests, would need to make
use of the effects doctrine in its competition law. By developing its economic unit theory in the Dyestuff case, the court was able, at least for

the time being, to leave a touchy issue relatively untouched.
Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. European Community Commission ("Continental Can") 99 was the next ECJ case to
address the Community's authority over non-Community corporations.
Continental Can, an American company, acquired a majority holding
in the German firm of Shmalback-Lubeca-Werhl AG in 1969. In 1970,
Continental Can formed a company, Europemballage, and incorporated
it in Delaware. It then transferred its Shmalback holdings to the Delaware corporation. Shortly thereafter, Europemballage acquired a majority holding in one of its Dutch licensees, Thomassen and DrijverVerblijfa NV. The Commission instituted proceedings against Continental Can and Europemballage, contending that Continental Can,
through the purchase of Shmalback, had obtained a dominant position
96. Id. at 601.
97. Id. at 605-06.
98. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
99. Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, [1973] 12 Common
Mkt. L.R. 199.
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in the market for preserved meat and fish. Its position in the market
was strengthened by the purchase of a competing firm, Thomassen, in
Holland to the extent that competition was virtually eliminated. 100 The
Commission issued a decision stating that Article 86 had been violated.' 0 1 Even though the court overturned the Commission decision be-

cause of inconsistencies and failings in the proof of whether there was
an abuse of a dominant position, the court ruled against Continental
Can on its jurisdictional objection to the Commission exercising authority over it as an American corporation. The court concluded that
Continental Can was subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and
of the Court of Justice since the acts of a wholly owned subsidiary
(Europemballage) could be attributed to the parent company (Conti-

nental Can). 0 2 This was a reiteration and variation on the economic
unit theme first sounded in the Dyestuffs case. 03 While the Advocate
General again planted the seeds for the adoption of an effects doctrine
by the court,'0 4 the court did not take the bait and instead.relied on its

already established economic unit theory.
In Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents Corp.

v. European Community Commission ("Commercial Solvents"),'0 5 the
ECJ once again avoided consideration of the effects doctrine by applying its economic unit theory. Commercial Solvents was a Maryland

corporation that manufactured and sold certain chemical products. In
1962, it acquired a 51 percent interest in an Italian chemical company.
100. Id. at 202-03.
101. Treaty of Rome Article 86 provides in relevant part:
ART. 86. To the extent to which trade between any member states may be affected
thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a
dominant position within the Common Market and shall thereby be prohibited.
Such improper practice may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling prices or
unfair trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) the application to the parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party of
additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Article 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48.
102. Continental Can, [1973] 12 Common Mkt. L.R. at 221.
103. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
104. Continental Can, [1973] 12 Common Mkt. L.R. at 221-22.
105. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Commercial Solvents Corp. v. E.C. Comm'n,
[1974] 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309.
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Until 1970, the Italian firm, Istituto, resold the aminobutanol manufactured by Commercial Solvents in the United States. In early 1970,
Commercial Solvents decided to cease supplying this product to the European Community. One of Istituto's customers, Zoja, placed a new
order for aminobutanol but was told that none was available. Apparently, Commercial Solvents was the only available source on a tight
world market. In April 1972, Zoja sought Commission action against
Istituto and Commercial Solvents for abuse of a dominant position in
violation of Article 86. An action was commenced by the Commission.
Relief was granted in a mandatory injunctive form against both Commercial Solvents and Istituto, and a fine was levied jointly and severally
against both companies. Except for a reduction in the amount of the
fine,' the court upheld the Commission in all respects.
While most commentators seem to regard this case as a minor one
that follows Dyestuffs and Continental Can, it is significant for a number of reasons. First, the case defines more fully the reach of the economic unit theory. Commercial Solvents argued that it did no business
in the Common Market and was, therefore, not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. Furthermore, it argued that it and Istituto had always acted independently, so that neither company could be held responsible for the acts of the other. 107 Never mentioning the effects
doctrine, the court implied that even if the two companies arguably
acted independently in most matters, they acted jointly in this instance
with regard to Zoja, and could therefore be considered an economic
unit for purposes of this litigation. 0 8 Thus, the court went further than
before by lowering the jurisdictional requirements necessary to find an
economic unit, thereby reaching outside the borders of the Community
with its judicial power. Henceforth, it would not be necessary to find
general commercial control by a foreign parent of a European subsidiary to reach the parent; instead, the court could find "united action"
with regard to the particular activity in order to assert jurisdiction. 10 9
In fact, the court came quite close here to replicating the practical outcome of the effects doctrine.
Perhaps even more significant to the issue of extraterritoriality was
the court's approval of the relief granted by the Commission and the
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

346.
318-19.
342-43.
344.
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rationale justifying it. 1" 0 The Commission ordered Commercial Solvents and Istituto to supply Zoja with specified amounts of the previously withheld chemical product and to submit proposals for future
supply. Not only did this order require affirmative acts by Commercial
Solvents outside the Community, i.e., in the United States, but it required Commercial Solvents to supply what Zoja needed for sale not
only to its European customers but also for its non-European customers. The court found in the language of Article 3 of Regulation 17"' a
sufficient basis to order affirmative acts to correct an infringement of
Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Having. found Commercial Solvents
to be part of an economic unit that operated within the Community, it
gave no express consideration to the fact that some of the ordered acts
would be performed outside the Community's borders. The non-mention of this issue indicates how far the court had .come in its willingness
to assert extraterritorial power. Furthermore, in denying Commercial
Solvent's contention that
the Commission has misused the powers intended to prevent competition from
being distorted within the Common Market and applied the provisions of Article
86 beyond the territory of the Community by-ordering supplies disproportionate
to the needs of Zoja for.supply of its customers within the Community and which
:correspond rather to its activities in the world .market,' l

the court rejected the assertion that only trade purely within the Community may be considered when gauging the consequences of an infringement and the appropriate remedy."' The court approved of the
110.
111.

Id. at 345-46.
Id. at 344. Council Regulation No. 17, Art. 3, 3 B. HAV K,UNITED STATES, COMMON
MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST Appendix 4, at 31 (1986) [hereinafter "Regulation
17"]. Regulation 17 provides in relevant part:
ART. 3. Termination of infringements§CU
1. Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own initiative, finds that there is
infringement of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty, it may by decision require the
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned to bring such infringement to

an end.
2. Those entitled to make application are:
(a) Member States;
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest.,
3. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Regulation, the Commission may,
before taking a decision under paragraph 1, address to the undertakings or associations
of undertakings concerned recommendations for termination of the infringement.
112. Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano and Comercial Solvents Corp v. E.C. Comm'n,
[1974], 13 Common Mkt. L.R. 309, 344.
113. Id. at 345.
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Commission's effort to protect the injured party as a healthy competitor, even if that went beyond correcting the harm done to it in the
European market." 4 Thus, both the court's willingness to order action
by a non-European defendant on non-European soil, and the court's
willingness to shield a European company from offshore consequences
of anticompetitive conduct, demonstrate a jurisdictional reach significantly expanding the territorial perimeter drawn by Dyestuffs and Continental Can. Commercial Solvents, reiterating and expanding the economic unit theory, so settled the issue of the susceptibility of a foreign
parent corporation with a Community subsidiary to Community jurisdiction that in subsequent competition cases" 5 none of the foreign defendants raised an objection to EEC jurisdiction.
At least as early as the landmark Dyestuffs case, the tension between the Commission and the ECJ regarding the effects doctrine was
evident. " 6 In Dyestuffs, the Advocate General had urged the court to
find jurisdiction over non-EC nationals on the basis of the effects doctrine. The Advocate General's advice followed the rationale for jurisdiction given in the Commission's decision. The court avoided the issue,
instead creating its own "economic unit" theory, an alternative to the
effects doctrine, as a means of asserting jurisdiction over foreign companies whose anticompetitive activities might harm Community interests. While ECJ case law over the next decade and a half continued to
rely on the economic unit theory for reaching entities outside EC borders, and while the Advocate General's opinions accompanying ECJ
cases seem to relent urging the Court's adoption of the effects doctrine,
the Commission did not tire of asserting the validity of that doctrine in
its own decisions." 7
B. National Courts: The Phillip Morris Case
Neither national courts nor administrative agencies in Europe
have explicitly accepted the effects doctrine." 8 There is, however, one
114. Ironically, the type of protection granted here to Zoja by the Commission and ECJ is
not unlike the protection sought by Westinghouse in the Uranium cartel. See In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1980).

'115. United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, [1978] 1 Common Mkt. L.R. 429; Hoffman-La Roche
& Co. v. Comm'n, [1979] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 211; Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Comm'n, [1979]
3 Common Mkt. L.R. 345.
116.
117.

See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., the Commission's argument in Re Wood Pulp, [1985] 3 Common Mkt. L.R.

474; Imperial Chem. Ind. Ltd. v. Comm'n, [1972] 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 557.
118.

Rosenthal has noted that the United States for half a century was the only nation or
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important exception. Germany, as the most aggressive enforcer of national competition law among the European states, has been the only
country to approximate the propounding of an antitrust effects jurisdiction. In Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Bundeskartellamt, 19 the Federal Cartel
Authority of the Federal Republic of Germany ("FCA") " embraced
the effects doctrine; further, the case constitutes a flirtation with that
doctrine, at least in a modified form, by the German national courts.
Phillip Morris and Rothmans International are major manufacturers of cigarettes on the world market. In addition, each controls a German subsidiary with major shares of that national market. In 1981, the
two international companies agreed to a merger under which Phillip
Morris would gain control of Rothmans. The merged company would
thereby have control of both German subsidiaries. The FCA found that
such a move would strengthen the market domination of the five major
tobacco companies in Germany, with two of those five being jointly
controlled. Although the agreement was negotiated by the two multinational companies outside of Germany, the FCA prohibited the entire
merger in 1982. The FCA imposed the prohibition, even though the
German acquisition was a small portion of the international merger.
Phillip Morris and Rothmans claimed that such an extraterritorial
exercise of power violated international law. The German Court of Appeals at Berlin partially upheld and partially reversed the Cartel Authority, modifying the prohibition order so that only the German part
of the merger remained outlawed. Significantly, the court of appeals
accepted the legitimacy of a limited form of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
that was functionally equivalent to the modified effects doctrine. The
court found it legal for the German government to regulate an agreeauthority (including the European Economic Community) that claimed the right to enforce its
jurisdiction unilaterally to override, in peacetime, contrary national laws or fundamental policies
of sovereign states concerning conduct taking place wholly or in significant part within foreign
territory. Now, that uniqueness may have diminished a bit, especially in regard to Germany and
the EC; however, it is generally indicative of how unaccepted the effects doctrine has been in most
national tribunals in Europe. It is only through the EC's preeminence in this area of law that
convergence between American and European doctrine is being forged,. national doctrine notwithstanding. See Rosenthal, supra note 5.
119. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Bundeskartellamt, 1984 E.C.C. 393 (Ct. App. 1983) (Case Kart
16/82); see D. ROSErHAL, supra note 5,at 3-4, 29-31, 38, 67.
120. The Federal Cartel Authority is the administrative agency in the Federal Republic of
Germany charged with enforcing German national antitrust law. Phillip Morris Inc. v.
Bundeskartellamt, 1984 E.C.C. 393, 405-07 (Ct. App. 1983) (Case Kart 16/82). Its substantive
jurisdiction over competition issues is concurrent with the EC Commission, although in cases of
conflict, EC law is supreme. Costa v. ENEL, [1964] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425; see also D.
ROSENTHAL,

supra note 5, at 38.
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ment negotiated outside Germany, at least to the extent that the German market was directly affected."'
Phillip Morris and Rothmans further appealed, asserting that even
the modified order violated principles of territoriality found in international law. Nevertheless, the German Supreme Court never ruled on
the legitimacy or extent of this effects doctrine issue. When the parties
restructured the transaction to limit to 24.5% Phillip Morris's voting
share in Rothmans, the court closed the case as moot.
After the restructuring agreement, but prior to the German Supreme Court's written opinion on the dismissal, the FCA prohibited the
restructured merger on grounds similar to those in its original order.
The FCA did not follow the court of appeals' approach of outlawing
only the German part of the merger. The FCA eventually dropped its
action against the companies, however, presumably in reaction to language from the German Supreme Court's opinion in the dismissal of
the first case, wherein standards for such prohibitions were articulated
that the FCA would have had difficulty meeting in regard to the restructured merger.1 2 2
C.

The Wood Pulp Case

The effects issue was not directly confronted for fifteen years following the Dyestuffs case because, in almost all circumstances, the results yielded by the ECJ's economic unit theory and the Commission's
effects doctrine were exactly the same. Most enterprises, whose actions
outside the Community cause effects within the Community, can somehow be fit within the very flexible bounds of what the ECJ considers an
"economic unit.""2 3 However, Re Wood Pulp Carte1 2 4 proved to be a
case in which the economic unit theory, for all its elasticity, could not
be stretched to cover truly non-European actors, whose actions outside
the Community affect EC competition. Perhaps sensing this, the Commission chose in its Fourteenth Annual Competition Report, which
121. This virtual acceptance of the effects doctrine may be unique among European national courts. However, since most of Western Europe leaves antitrust policy and enforcement to
the EC, such uniqueness is somewhat less significant.
122. Telephone interview with Bradley Brooks, counsel to Phillip Morris, New York, New
York (June 1, 1990).
123. See supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
124.

[1985] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 474.
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highlighted the Wood Pulp case, to use explicitly
the language "effects
12 8
doctrine" as an asserted tenet of EC law.
The Wood Pulp case involved a price-fixing conspiracy consisting
of approximately three dozen producers of sulfate wood pulp and several related trade associations. Wood pulp is used in the manufacture
of paper, and the European Community imports the bulk of its wood
pulp from Scandinavia and North America. Most of the defendants in
this case were companies located in Sweden, Finland, Canada, and the
United States. Among them, these four countries produced over threequarters of the sulfate pulp sold on the world market. Ten United
States companies and one trade association 26 were charged initially by
the Commission, and nine companies and1 27the trade association were
fined from 50,000 ECU to 500,000 ECU.
The Commission reached a decision in the matter in 1984. It concluded that price fixing in violation- of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
had occurred. The case was unique in that the Commission was facing
for the first time an Article 85 price fixing situation where neither the
enterprises involved, nor any of their corporate affiliates, were located
within the European Community. Thus, the economic unit theory that
had been favored by the European Court of Justice in exerting extraterritorial reach over non-EC competition law offenders was useless. In
order to reach these defendants, the Commission had to confront directly the issue of whether the Community should accept an Alcoastyle effects doctrine for antitrust prosecutions. The Commission answered that question in the affirmative, and found the non-European
parties liable for violation of European competition laws. 28
The Commission made no attempt to justify its exercise of jurisdiction by economic unit theory. It implicitly admitted in section 79 of
its opinion that not all the "addressees" were "doing business" in the
Community, as some were only "exporting" to the EC.2 9 While it was
125. Commission of the European Communities, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy
59 (1984).
126. The Webb Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982), provides an antitrust exemption
for groups formed to market American goods abroad. Because these groups act as cartels, they are
prohibited from selling domestically. See B. HAWK, supra note 67, at 165-71.
127. Re Wood Pulp, [1985] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 474. ECU are European Currency Units,
a monetary unit not actually in circulation but referred to in the official acts of the EEC and
whose value is based on the value of a "basket" of the currencies of the member states of the
EEC. POLICY MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 129 (H. Wallace, W. Wallace, C. Webb
eds. 1977).
128. Re Wood Pulp, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 547-54.
129. It is interesting that at this time Community literature started interchangeably using
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mentioned that "some" of the companies involved had corporate ties
within the Community, they were not even identified. Thus, the Commission did not retain the economic unit rationale as an available
fallback position. Rather, it relied totally on the effects doctrine and
appeared to be challenging the ECJ to face the issue on appeal.
On appeal, the case remained undecided by the European Court of
Justice for an inordinately long period of time (almost four years),
probably reflecting the doctrinal discomfort that members of the court
felt with the apparent need to adopt the effects doctrine. The facts
clearly established a price-fixing conspiracy; the only remaining question was whether EC law would reach that conspiracy. The only way to
reach the conspiracy appeared to be by adopting the effects doctrine, a
step that the court had successfully avoided for almost twenty years. In
contrast to the seminal Dyestuffs case and its progeny, the court could
not fall back on the somewhat artificially constructed "economic unit"
theory. There were no companies with which these wood pulp defendants formed "economic units" within the EC. If they had violated EC
competition law, they had clearly done so as outsiders causing deleterious effects within the Community. Finally, in 1988, the court issued its
opinion. Unlike in Dyestuffs, this time it agreed with the Advocate
General and adopted a modified version of the American-style effects
doctrine. The court essentially recognized the validity of the objective
territorial form of jurisdiction that the effects doctrine represents. The
court identified a "modified" effects doctrine, taking cognizance of the
doctrinal retrenchment by which the United States had pulled back
from its extreme overreaching of the two decades following World War
II. The ECJ's position may indicate that the court finds it much easier
to adopt the reasonable extraterritorial position that United States doctrine now occupies than the rather extreme position occupied by United
States extraterritoriality doctrine around 1970 when the Dyestuffs case
was decided. Initially, contrary transatlantic doctrines thus have converged somewhere in the middle.
The court's judgment per se was the shortest part of the Wood
Pulp opinion, much shorter than either its recitation of either the Commission's position or the Advocate General's extensive and scholarly
advice to the court. Unlike the Commission or the Advocate General,
the court did not explicitly subscribe to the effects doctrine; neverthethe phrase "anti-trust law" with the phrase "competition law." The adoption of the American
usage perhaps reflected a change of attitude which also signaled adoption of certain American
doctrine.
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less, it is clear in reading the judgment that it implicitly adopted the
effects doctrine in its qualified form, as propounded by the Commission
and the Advocate General. The court's reluctance to incant the words,
"[t]his court adopts the effects doctrine," probably reflects deference to
the sensitivities of European, especially British, politicians and lawyers
who have vehemently opposed the doctrine over the years.
Paragraphs 13, 14, 17 and 18 of its judgment, when read together
with the rest of the Wood Pulp case, and particularly the Commission's
and Advocate General's opinions, make it clear that the court has
adopted a modified effects doctrine. When in paragraph thirteen the
court states, "[the Wood Pulp producers] are taking part in concertation which has the object and effect of restricting competition within
the Common Market,"' 30 the court is precisely following Alcoa-style
effects doctrine analysis. The court's adoption is made even more clear
by the court's pronouncement in paragraph seventeen that "it is immaterial in that respect whether or not they had recourse to subsidiaries,
agents, sub-agents, or branches within the Community in order to
make their contacts with purchasers within the Community."'' Such
immateriality means the court feels no need to rely on its previous economic unit theory to maintain Community extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This can only be because it has an alternative basis for such jurisdiction, and the only alternative mentioned is the effects doctrine. When
in paragraph fourteen the court concludes, "[t]he Commission has not
'
made an incorrect assessment of the territorial scope of Article 85 , 132
it is pointing directly to the only theory that the Commission had articulated in this case, namely the modified effects doctrine. Thus, when
in paragraph eighteen the court concludes that "[a]ccordingly the
Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct
is covered by the territoriality principle as universally recognised in
public international law,"'s3 the "territoriality" spoken of is the court's
objective territoriality; and under these circumstances of an antitrust
prosecution, objective territoriality means the effects doctrine.'
As
noted by the Advocate General, "[tlhe principal of objective territorial130. In Re Wood Pulp Cartel, [1988] 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 901, 941.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The analysis here rejects the conclusion reached by a casenote, Note, supra note 8,
that the ECJ accepted objective territoriality, but not the effects doctrine, in its Wood Pulp decision. In the circumstances of this case, there is no logical basis for distinguishing the two. See also
M. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 243-47"(1988).
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ity has played a decisive role in the extension of national jurisdiction in
the field of competition. From it is derived the effects doctrine." 185 The

Advocate General and the court correctly recognize that the Alcoastyle effects doctrine is a manifestation of the general principal of objective territoriality.
D. EC Institutions
The different roles played by the various Community institutions
in the scheme of European federalism may partially explain the historic
divergence between the ECJ and the Commission-on the issue of extraterritoriality. There is a certain linkage between extraterritoriality and
supranationality. The Commission is the most supranational of all the
Community institutions, i.e., it was meant to promote pan-European,
Community-wide interests as paramount.18 6 It is probably the EC institution most steadfastly committed to European unity. The Council, in
contrast, explicitly represents the interests of individual member states,
and to a great degree its meetings resemble traditional intergovernmental negotiations, rather than the convening of a Community institution.1 8 7 The European Parliament, now directly elected,1 8 appears supranational in form but exercises little power and is composed of
members with greatly varying views on supranationality. a9 The Court
of Justice is probably second only .to the Commission in promoting European integration;""° furthermore, on the issue of extending the extraterritorial reach of EC competition law the court is clearly behind the
Commission. This is understandable. Since the Commission's institutional role is explicitly defined as supranational, and since the Commission is the executive arm of the Community, it makes perfect sense that
it should establish its own role as principal enforcer of European competition law within the Community, and should expand the interna135.

Re Wood Pulp, [19881 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 901, 920.

136.

INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

1-43 (J. Lodge ed. 1983).

EUROPE'S WOULD-BE POLITY: PATTERNS OF CHANGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

82-100 (L.

Lindberg & S. Scheingold eds. 1970).

137.

D.

LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

196 (1987).

138. Prior to 1979, members were appointed from their national governments and parties
and were thus less independently answerable to the public. D. FREESTONE & J. DAVIDSON, supra

note 18, at 71-84.
139.

Its only two real powers are approval of the EC budget and the ability to dissolve the

Commission (rarely exercised). Id.
140. The Court has been especially instrumental in assuring the supremacy of Community
over national law, thus fostering integration. Id. at 33.
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tional reach of that law in a way that validates its international legal
personality. The more clearly and widely recognized the Commission's
legal personality becomes, and the more expansive its substantive
scope, the more a supranational European union is fostered. While the
ECJ also has been willing to promote European integration, it has
other irons in this particular fire. By definition, the ECJ is the most
lawyer dominated of the EC institutions. For years European jurists
have fought a tenacious defensive action against creeping American objective territoriality.1 4 1 It is unlikely that those legal experts would
change their tune simply because an American ox was about to be
gored by a European bull. It would be an especially unlikely doctrinal
reversal given the English, French, and German positions taken regarding the uranium cartel cases or the Soviet gas pipeline dispute. Furthermore, some of the European justices probably believed simply that
the effects doctrine, even in support of European integration, could not
be justified.
Both the European Court of Justice and the European Commission
extended the extraterritorial reach of Community competition law during the fifteen years between Dyestuffs and Wood Pulp. Although the
Commission has been more forthright and less ambivalent about this
extension, both bodies clearly moved closer to the American effects
doctrine and to extraterritoriality at a time when United States institutions are realizing the limits Of their power, and are retrenching from
the more extreme manifestations of extraterritoriality.
E. ExtraterritorialityDoctrine and 1992
At first blush there does not appear to be a relationship between
the advent of the single European Market in 1992 and the Transatlantic convergence of extraterritoriality doctrine. On closer inspection,
however, there is one. There seems to be a synergy among the myriad
of international phenomena occurring lately: peaceful revolution in
Eastern Europe, less peaceful revolution in Southern Africa and Cen141. France v. Turkey 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser.) A. No.10 (Sept. 7, 1927) (the case of the S.S.
"Lotus"). The Permanent Court of International Justice made it clear that there is no general
prohibition in customary international law against applying local law to foreign activities when it
ruled that a state was free to act unless a specific customary prohibition against the exercise of
prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction was found. See Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts or "There and Back Again," 25 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 7, 12-13 (1984).
142. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,415 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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tral America, brutal reaction in China, and growing unification in
Western Europe. All are changes that interact with each other.
The transatlantic convergence of extraterritoriality doctrine fits
within the context of these monumental trends. The harmonization of
law among Western industrialized nations represents a spatial integration of human activity, just as the harmonization of law within the European Community is part of such an integration. The goal of a single
European market by 1992, with regulatory uniformity, represents normative harmonization within an emerging federal system. The convergence of effects doctrine represents a normative harmonization by that
system with other systems.
As political boundaries change, some of them disappearing and
some of them being redrawn, legal norms must emerge to accommodate new reality. If 1992 is not to be the advent of "Fortress Europe,"

and the Western Europeans claim it is not, then the basis for economic
intercourse between Eastern Europe and North America, as well as the
rest of the world, must include norms of behavior that are shared. The
modified effects doctrine is one such emerging norm; it reflects both the
diminished significance of state borders and the need for comity between states.
Law has two overriding functions in society, including international society: first, it implements norms, and second, it limits power.
The modified effects doctrine performs both functions. The norm that it
implements is fair competition, a value that condemns the abuse of economic position by those who would seek to rig markets for their selfish
and antisocial advantage. The doctrine is power limiting in two ways;
in its antimonopolistic substantive thrust, and by its jurisdictional limitations which control legislative, executive, and judicial overreach on
the part of individual states.
Both of these functions of law, value implementation and power
limitation, are advanced by the transatlantic convergence of extraterritoriality doctrine. They are advanced in a manner harmonious with recent international events which might represent the beginning of an
international rule of law.
V.

CONVERGENCE OF LAW IN AN INTEGRATING WORLD

The modified effects doctrine implicitly recognizes transnational
interdependence. Unlike the rigid nineteenth-century brand of jurisdictional territoriality, it allows for some necessary transborder regulation
of economic activity. But unlike overreaching versions of the effects
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doctrine, the modified version recognizes a need to refrain from extraterritorial regulation in some situations where one state's policies must
be balanced against those of another. Thus, the modified doctrine realistically rejects both absolutist concepts of state sovereignty and juridical imperialism by dominant economic powers.
The Wood Pulp case is evidence of European acceptance of the
modified effects doctrine by the continent's most important political/
economic entity, the European Community. It is also evidence of the
growth of Community power and confidence. The international trade
stature of the Community is comparable to that of the United States,
so it is natural that the EC has become comparably assertive in the
application of its economic law to international transactions affecting
it.
American acceptance of an effects doctrine, modified in its reach
by a respect for the policies and interests of other countries, similarly
reflects the growth of European Community economic power. As in Europe, the precise parameters of the effects doctrine are disputed in
American legal circles, as demonstrated by the controversy over the
Third Restatement. Nevertheless, the dominant viewpoints have converged across the Atlantic: a modified effects doctrine that balances the
need for interregional economic regulation with the need for interregional comity.
Recent events in both Eastern and Western Europe make this convergence of law more significant. The issue of "Fortress Europe" is relevant here. If the United States and others want easy access to the
single European market after 1992, a transatlantic harmonization of
both competition law and of rules affecting cross-border application of
that law is obviously important. The perception by the EC of American
regulatory overreach could certainly add a meter or two to the walls of
the feared European economic fortress.
A "Fortress Europe" looms even more imposing now that within
its walls stands a united Germany. This prospect should make transatlantic comity still more important to Americans. Competition doctrine
raises internal EC policy problems as well as external ones in regard to
Germany. A command economy such as existed in East Germany is
incompatible with the core principles of both EC and American competition law. Competition authorities probably will be forced to exercise
some restraint in the enforcement of competition law during the transformation and integration into the EC of the East German economy.
The need for transatlantic comity is apparent in this situation in that
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the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law to enterprises in East Germany would be nonsensical during that nation's
transformation period, notwithstanding any dealings that might occur
with American markets or persons. Beyond Germany, the rest of Eastern Europe's economies also are, in varying degrees, approaching market directed change. The "varying degrees" are significant. Western
media reports sometimes miss the extent to which these countries intend to retain elements of socialism within pluralistic democratic political systems. It is simply not clear how similar to an American style
market economy these transforming societies will ultimately look.
Therefore, it is also unclear to what degree they will operate in conformity with EC and American competition law. Under these circumstances, limits must be imposed on the effects jurisdiction available to
potential American and EC plaintiffs.
The world market is expanding. Newly industrialized countries
like Taiwan and Korea have become major producers of manufactured
goods and will likely become major consumers of the products and services of others. Developing nations like Brazil and Mexico aim to follow suit. In the latter's case a free trade agreement with the United
States may complement the U.S.-Canadian free trade arrangement,
perhaps leading to a huge Common Market of North America. Europe's own Common Market of twelve (itself growing more unified)
will undoubtedly have increasing ties with a larger Europe of some
thirty-odd interdependent states, some from the former Soviet block. A
great variety of economies and economic philosophies must coexist
under such global economic integration. For example, some nations
might promote the very sort of marketing and pricing arrangements
that the competition laws of other states explicitly condemn. And no
nation, not even the U.S., is so dominant as to be able to dictate economic norms, in competition law or elsewhere, to the growing community of industrialized states. Thus, an expanding world market means
an expanding potential for jurisdictional conflict in economic regulation. The convergence of conflicts law, in forms like a mutually accepted modified effect doctrine, is very desirable, probably essential in
these circumstances.

